If the beneficiary of an altruist's gift can be expected to use this gift efficiently, then a pure altruist (one who cares about the beneficiary's utility level, but now how utility is obtained) should only give gifts of money. This is often interpreted to mean that any other type of gift is...

I apply Kandori, Mailath and Rob (Econometrica, 1993) evolutionary dynamic to undiscounted finitely repeated two player games, without common interests. I find an Evolutionary “Folk Theorem” under slightly more restrictive conditions that are required for a standard “Folk Theorem”...

This paper presents a model of an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. If entry occurs, then competition proceeds through Cournot quantity competition. My model, like those of (e.g.) Dixit and Ware, includes a strategic use for capacity prior to entry. However, it differs in that I consider a...

I apply stochastic stability (Kandori, Mailath and Rob, Econometrica 1993, and Young Econometrica 1993) to a contracting game. There are three stages to this game. In the first, a surplus sharing transfer is made. This is followed by a relationship specific investment and finally bargaining over...

We examine legal services contracts characterized by a contingency fee and an hours reporting requirement in a moral hazard setting. We find that hours reporting requirements in contingency contracts can reduce the rent needed to induce high attorney effort under moral hazard. Under certain...