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In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare...
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Patients needing kidney transplants may have donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other pairs only when there is a “double coincidence of wants.†Developing infrastructure to...
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Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also many transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility,...
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Okul seçimi konusundaki temel meselelerden bir tanesi öðrenci yerleþtirilmeleriyle ilgili bir mekanizma tasarlamaktýr. Eðitim yazýný, böyle mekanizmalarýn tasarlanmasýyla ilgili yol göstermesine raðmen belirli tasarýlar sunmamaktadýr. Halen var olan okul seçimi planlarýndaki...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011105319
We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots...
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