Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The...

Network formation is frequently modeled using link-formation games and typically present a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Cooperative refinements - such as strong or coalitional proof Nash equilibria - have been the standard tool used for equilibrium selection in these games. Non-cooperative...

La presente investigación tiene dos objetivos básicos. Primero, se utilizarán elementos de la Teoría de Juegos Evolutivos para evaluar la estabilidad de distintos tipos de preferencias en el contexto de la explotación de un recurso de propiedad común. En particular, analizaremos la...

Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling be a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some of which produce the wrong outcome. A possible...

Multiple group memberships are the rule rather than the exception. Locally operating groups frequently offer the advantage of providing social recognition and higher marginal benefits to the individual, whereas globally operating groups may be more beneficial from a social perspective. Within a...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralized markets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationary monetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a...

In the recent literature, several hypotheses have been put forward in order to explain the decline of contributions in repeated public good games. We present results of an experiment which allows to evaluate these hypotheses. The main characteristics of our experimental design are a variation of...

In a duopoly market, aspiration levels express how much sellers want to earn given their expectations about the other?s behavior. We augment the sellers? decision task by eliciting their profit aspiration. In a first experimental phase, whenever satisficing is not possible, sales choices, point...

We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate behavior in two settings that are frequently posited in the policy literature as generating different outcomes: private property and common property. The experimental settings closely parallel earlier experimental studies...