Showing 1 - 9 of 9
This paper presents a novel model of promotion within the firm which sheds new light on the interplay between working hours and the odds of subsequent promotion. The model's key feature is the coexistence of two different sources of asymmetric information: (i) the worker's cost of long working...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653182
This study examines how sensitivity, which is defined as the degree to which a decision maker (DM) incorporates experts' opinions into his/her own decision-making, affects the precision of communication with experts when communication is strategic. We develop a simple cheap talk model comprising...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012910890
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010187096
This paper presents a novel model of promotion within the firm which sheds new light on the interplay between working hours and the odds of subsequent promotion. The model's key feature is the coexistence of two different sources of asymmetric information: (i) the worker's cost of long working...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011595957
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012128802
We analyze a simple task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on the state. If the agents have standard concave utility, the principal assigns the task to an agent with the highest productivity in each state. In contrast, if the agents are loss...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902089
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010171637
This paper presents a novel model of promotion within the firm which sheds new light on the interplay between working hours and the odds of subsequent promotion. The model's key feature is the coexistence of two different sources of asymmetric information: (i) the worker's cost of long working...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966052
We analyze a task-assignment model in which a principal assigns a task to one of two agents depending on future states. If the agents have concave utility, the principal assigns the task to them contingent on the state. We show that if the agents are loss averse, a state-independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702791