This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the...

We study many-to-one matching with complementarities. Real life examples include college admissions with two-sided monetary transfers, teacher assignment with different teaching loads, worker assignment. Due to the presence of complementarities, the conditions that are essential for the...

We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students’ reported preferences. We show that heuristics solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on...

We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show...

Affirmative action schemes must confront the tension between admitting the highest scoring applicants and ensuring diversity. In Chicago's affirmative action system for exam schools, applicants are divided into one of four socioeconomic tiers based on the characteristics of their neighborhood....

Affirmative action schemes must confront the tension between admitting the highest scoring applicants and ensuring diversity. In Chicago's affirmative action system for exam schools, applicants are divided into one of four socioeconomic tiers based on the characteristics of their neighborhood....

We say that a mechanism is harmless if no student can ever misreport his preferences so that he does not hurt but someone else. We consider a large class of rules which includes the Boston, the agent-proposing deferred acceptance, and the school-proposing deferred acceptance mechanisms (sDA). In...

In Europe, every year more than 200,000 college students study in different countries thanks to the Erasmus Student Exchange program. The program aims to improve the integration all around Europe. Although this exchange program is successful in many dimensions, it has two major drawbacks. First...

We study the allocation of homogeneous positions under affirmative action policies where some positions are reserved for underrepresented groups on a “minimum guarantee” basis. Each individual has a merit-based score and may be eligible for multiple reserves. When an individual counts...

We study a new variant of the school choice problem in which capacities can be altered by distributing additional seats across schools in response to students’ reported preferences. We show that heuristic solutions to this capacity design problem can be inefficient, even if they focus on...