, increase corporate risk-taking by monitor and discipline the controlling shareholder’s self-serving decisions. However, as … contradict the expectation of most prior studies on the influence of individual shareholders on corporate risk-taking. …Purpose: This study examines the influence of individual blockholders on corporate risk-taking using Korean-listed firm …

We test the hypothesis whether a specific aspect of culture - trust in others - affects shareholder voting behavior by … in high-trust countries while the percentage of votes in support of management proposals is higher. Shocks to trust and … monitoring when trust is high. …

We test the hypothesis that a specific aspect of culture - trust in others - affects shareholder voting behavior as it … shareholder meetings is lower in high-trust countries while the percentage of votes in support of management is higher. Shocks to … trust and IV regressions support this result. We also find that shareholder voting is more valuable in low-trust countries …

majority shareholders on earnings management. Furthermore, the primary objective of this research is to investigate the … moderating role of board meeting frequency between ownership shares and directors’ proportions as majority shareholders on … variables. This study also presents empirical evidence that ownership of shares by directors and majority shareholders was …

We show that in countries with more societal trust shareholders cast fewer votes at shareholder meetings and are more … performance in high-trust countries, suggesting that managers do not exploit greater discretion when trust is high. We also find a … negative relation between trust and bond spreads. Our evidence supports theory arguing that trust substitutes for monitoring …