Similar Search Results

The distinction between dictatorial and incentive policy interventions and its implication for IV estimation

Belzil, Christian; Hansen, Jörgen - 2010

We investigate if, and under which conditions, the distinction between dictatorial and incentive-based policy interventions affects the capacity of Instrument Variable (IV) methods to estimate the relevant treatment effect parameter of an outcome equation. The analysis is set in a non-trivial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269878

Identification and estimation of distributional impacts of interventions using changes in inequality measures

Firpo, Sergio - 2010

This paper presents semiparametric estimators of distributional impacts of interventions (treatment) when selection to the program is based on observable characteristics. Distributional impacts of a treatment are calculated as differences in inequality measures of the potential outcomes of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269881

Documentation IZAΨMOD: The IZA policy sImulation mODel

Peichl, Andreas; Schneider, Hilmar; Siegloch, Sebastian - 2010

This paper describes IZAΨMOD, the policy microsimulation model of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). The model uses household microdata from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study and firm data from the German linked employer-employee dataset LIAB. IZAΨMOD consists of three components:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269886

Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services: Theory and experiment

Beck, Adrian; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Qiu, Jianying; … - 2010

We examine the influence of guilt and trust on the performance of credence goods markets. An expert can make a promise to a consumer first, whereupon the consumer can express her trust by paying an interaction price before the expert's provision and charging decisions. We argue that the expert's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269892

Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy

Lindner, Axel - 2008

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269906

Systematic Mispricing in European Equity Prices?

Berneburg, Marian - 2007

One empirical argument that has been around for some time and that clearly contra- dicts equity market efficiency is that market prices seem too volatile to be optimal estimates of the present value of future discounted cash flows. Based on this, it is deduced that systematic pricing errors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269909

Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?

Lindner, Axel - 2007

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269917

Schätzunsicherheit oder Korrelation, Welche Risikokomponente sollten Unternehmen bei der Bewertung von Kreditportfoliorisiken wann berücksichtigen?

Dannenberg, Henry - 2007

uncertainty. The latter can be quantified by confidence intervals. But assumptions about dependencies of these intervals are … which include estimation uncertainty but ignore default correlation might estimate the real credit risk more correctly than … a model that implicates default correlation but ignore estimation uncertainty. The latter is a trait of conventional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269918

Raising juveniles

Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T. - 2010

This paper investigates how families make decisions about the education of juveniles. The decision problem is analyzed in three variations: a 'decentralized' scheme, in which the parents control the purse-strings, but the children dispose of their time as they see fit; a 'hierarchical' scheme,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269937

Optimal incentive contracts under moral hazard when the agent is free to leave

Englmaier, Florian; Muehlheusser, Gerd; Roider, Andreas - 2010

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269938