The paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity may be challenged. Focusing fi…rst on weak patents, i.e. patents that have a high probability of being invalidated by a court if challenged, we show that the patent holder fi…nds it optimal to...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private—domestic or foreign—firm competes with a public, welfare-maximizing firm. A central goal of the paper is to present a unified and general treatment of the basic question of what...

This paper investigates the choice of a licensing mechanism by the holder of a patent whose validity is uncertain. We provide sufficient conditions of a general nature under which the licensor prefers to use a per-unit royalty contract. In particular we show that this is the case for the holders...

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in...