Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004 … higher rates of aggregate collusion in markets with fewer firms are driven by the changes in incentives or focality rather … than purely the number of firms. These findings imply that antitrust policies aimed at preventing collusion should focus on …

Multiple Cournot oligopoly experiments found more collusive behavior in markets with fewer firms (Huck et al., 2004 … higher rates of aggregate collusion in markets with fewer firms are driven by the changes in incentives or focality rather … than purely the number of firms. These findings imply that antitrust policies aimed at preventing collusion should focus on …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it … facilitates collusion and discourages deviation. …

to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it … facilitates collusion and discourages deviation. …

to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it … facilitates collusion and discourages deviation. …

to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it … facilitates collusion and discourages deviation. …

to game-theoretic reasoning, our results show that collusion is significantly larger when the demand shrinks than when it … facilitates collusion and discourages deviation. …