We model an information mosaic in which multiple signals, one gathered by an informed trader and the other publicly disclosed by the manager of the firm, are combined to estimate firm value. Under testable conditions, voluntary disclosures lead to higher ex-ante information asymmetry and...

This paper estimates a dynamic model of clients' decisions to switch audit firm and misstate earnings as a function of auditor tenure. Adapting the conditional choice probability framework of Hotz and Miller (1993), which simplifies the estimation to a conditional logit, we find that dynamic...

We develop a mechanism explaining the emergence of heavy tails in the distribution of detected frauds. In our model, a manager manipulates earnings for a private benefit and updates her belief about monitoring quality over time, perceiving the monitor to be increasingly less effective as frauds...

When facing repeated interactions, firms in an oligopoly can engage in tacit collusion, using the threat of a price war in future periods to sustain higher prices and industry profits in the current period. This paper explores how strategic voluntary disclosures can play an important role as...

At the fundamental level, the key challenge to a theory of income measurement is to resolve the problem caused by soft information, which leads to incomplete preferences within the entity (i.e. some alternatives are not always unambiguously ranked). This paper presents a formal axiomatic...