An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his referrals remain high. The principal under-utilizes information in settings (i) and (ii). In setting …

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding … it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without …

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately …) equilibrium. Fully informative myopic and farsighted equilibria essentially take a particular simple form: all communication is … and analyze equilibrium welfare. Furthermore, we extend our model to public communication and investigate the implications …

other hand the decision makers rely too much on the received information. Moreover, communication as well as payoffs …In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission … models differ in the information that the receiver possesses and the senderś knowledge about these information. Lai, 2010 …

An entrepreneur contracts with a consultant, who is protected by limited liability, to supply information about the … probability than a bad one. The entrepreneur makes an upfront payment that the consultant can either invest in information … entrepreneurs so long as his informal referrals remain high. The principal finds it optimal to under-utilize information if she uses …