This paper surveys recent work on the evolutionary origins of preferences. We are especially interested in the circumstances under which evolution would push preferences away from the self-interested perfectly-rational expected utility maximization of classical economic theory in order to...

We examine contemporaneous perfect E-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best E response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect E-equilibrium. A strategy profile...

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a...

We examine contemporaneous perfect equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within of a best response. This concept implies, but is not implied by Radner's ex ante perfect equilibrium. A strategy profile is a...

This paper describes a research program organized around the theme of “What Makes Societies Work?” There are two stages. The first is a study of how context and institutions affect people’s incentives. Why do people’s preferences appear to be helpfully prosocial in some settings, and...

Explores the plant growth and exit patterns that underlie the gross employment flows for the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1967-1982. Data was obtained from the U.S. Census of Manufactures. Using Jovanovic's (1982) theoretical model, which relies on employer heterogeneity and market selection...

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make from the hypothesis that the current allocation is...

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...

We analyze a model in which agents make investments and then match into pairs to create a surplus. The agents can make transfers to reallocate their pretransfer ownership claims on the surplus. Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013) showed that when investments are unobservable, equilibrium...