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A quantitative version of Myerson regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2015

In auction and mechanism design, Myerson's classical regularity condition is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper introduces L-regularity as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402720

The quantitative view of Myerson regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2015 - December 2015

In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011406392

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830

Central Bank Liquidity Auction Mechanism Design and the Interbank Market

Ollikka, Kimmo - 2013

We study whether the mechanism design in the central bank liquidity auctions matters for the interbank money market … valuations in the liquidity auctions. The model captures the relevant features of how the European Central Bank sells liquidity …. We use simulations to compare discriminatory price, uniform price and Vickrey auctions to a posted price mechanism with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013075449

The quantitative view of Myerson regularity

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416003

Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

Burkett, Justin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 133-155

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673069

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2016

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986936

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022 - This version: July 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We ftll this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362215

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022 - This version: January 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We fill this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012815003