This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clark-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted...

We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...

We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer (1996), connecting their theoretical results...

Many centralized assignment systems seek to not only provide good matches for participants' current needs, but also to accommodate changes in preferences and circumstances. We study the problem of designing a dynamic reassignment mechanism in the context of Norway's system for allocating...

We derive the optimal funding mechanism to incentivize development and production of vaccines against diseases with epidemic potential. In the model, suppliers' costs are private information and investments are noncontractible, precluding cost-reimbursement contracts, requiring fixed-price...

Kidney exchange emerges as a pioneering application in the early stages of market design. In contrast to most other successful applications in the field, where design economists primarily serve as consultants to decision-makers, in the context of kidney exchange, they assumed the role of...