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The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social choice rule. If a mechanism has the property that, in each possible state of the world, the set of equilibrium outcomes...
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We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
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We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that dier with respect to what is commonly known about the weight that agents attach to reciprocal kindness. When the designer has no information on reciprocity types, implementability of an...
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rights. Dietrich and List (2008) have generalised this result to the setting of binary judgement aggregation. This paper …
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How should a decision-maker allocate R&D funds when a group of experts provides divergent estimates on a technology … ambiguity over the aggregation of expert opinion and a decision-maker's attitude towards it. In line with the paper's focus on R …&D investment, decision variables in our model may affect experts' subjective probability distributions of the future potential of a …
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