This paper describes a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student sellers first make investment decisions then production decisions. The classroom...

The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustain a collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium given subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc- cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance...

The authors describe a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student "sellers" first make investment decisions and then production decisions. The...

A framework is developed with which both R&D-subsidies and R&D-cooperatives can be analyzed. It is shown that in most cases providing R&D-subsidies is more effective in promoting private R&D than allowing for an R&D-cooperative. Moreover, considering the implementation of both R&D stimulating...

Introducing a finite reservation price in Hotelling’s spatial duopoly with linear transportation costs shows that (i) there dose not exist a pure strategy symmetric location equilibrium of the reservation price is 'high’, (ii) there exists a unique pure strategy symmetric location...

J. M. Connor and E. B. Peterson (1992) analyzes structural and behavioral characteristics explaining differences in price between competing national and private label brands of manufactured food products. J. Hiloopen and S. Martin's (1995) comment points out an error in reporting results and an...

We propose a quantification of the p-p plot that assigns equal weight to all distances between the respective distributions: the surface between the p-p plot and the diagonal. This surface is labeled the Harmonic Weighted Mass (HWM) index. We introduce the diagonal-deviation (d-d) plot that...

The authors describe a classroom experiment that illustrates the research and development investment incentives facing firms when technological spillovers are present. The game involves two stages in which student "sellers" first make investment decisions and then production decisions. The...