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Cartel stability in experimental auctions

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander; Treuren, Leonard - 2019

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011960510

Going once, going twice, reported! : Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - In: European economic review : EER 70 (2014), pp. 317-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010498841

Going once, going twice, reported!

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2013

modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN, neither antitrust policy has a significant effect on cartel … deterrence, cartelstability, cartel recidivism, and winning bids. In FP, traditional antitrust policy deters cartelformation …, destabilizes cartels, reduces the probability that a cartel re-establishes, and reduces theaverage winning bid. In contrast, while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379129

Collusion and the choice of auction : an experimental study

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2013

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011382492

Going Once, Going Twice, Reported!

Hinloopen, Jeroen; Onderstal, Sander - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325640

Hybrid collusion : algorithmic pricing in human-computer laboratory markets

Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin - 2021

We investigate collusive pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of (tacit) collusion when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm in the market delegating its decisions to an algorithm. We further vary whether participants...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012509134