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Prudent rationalizability in generalized extensive-form games with unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2019 - This version: June 17, 2019

We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive- form games with unawareness … set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we … show that prudent rationalizability yields unraveling under full awareness but unraveling might fail under unawareness. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012101418

Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-Form Games with Unawareness

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - 2019

We define a cautious version of extensive-form rationalizability for generalized extensive-form games with unawareness … set. We demonstrate the applicability of prudent rationalizability. In games of disclosure of verifiable information, we … show that prudent rationalizability yields unraveling under full awareness but unraveling might fail under unawareness. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012655879

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 121 (2020), pp. 329-367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430288

Political awareness, microtargeting of voters, and negative electoral campaigning

Shipper, Burkhard C.; Hee Yeul Woo - 2014

In modern elections, ideologically motivated candidates with a wealth of information about individual voters and sophisticated campaign strategies are faced by voters who lack awareness of some political issues and are uncertain about the exact political positions of candidates. We study to what...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010255046

Perfect forward induction

Yang, Chih-Chun - In: Economics letters 170 (2018), pp. 113-116

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012019675

Extensive-form level-k thinking

Schipper, Burkhard; Zhou, Hang - 2022

Level-k thinking and Cognitive Hierarchy have been widely applied as a normalform solution concept in behavioral and experimental game theory. We consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Player's may learn about levels of opponents' thinking during the play of the game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013350881

Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard - In: Games and economic behavior 81 (2013), pp. 50-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358108

Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment

Schipper, Burkhard C.; Li, Ying Xue - 2018

. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall we observe …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011936493

On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability

Heifetz, Aviad; Perea, Andrés - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 44 (2015) 1, pp. 37-59

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378383

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