We test whether long-run consumption risk can explain the cross-section of corporate bond risk premiums. We find that a one-factor model with long-run consumption growth explains the risk premiums on bond portfolios sorted on credit spreads, maturity, credit rating, downside risk, idiosyncratic...

We embed systematic default, pro-cyclical recovery rates and habit persistence into a model with a slight possibility of a macroeconomic disaster of reasonable magnitude. We derive analytical solutions for defaultable bond prices and show that a single set of structural parameters calibrated to...

We present empirical evidence that the innovation in global equity correlation is a viable pricing factor in international markets. We develop a stylized model to motivate why this is a reasonable candidate factor and propose a simple way to measure it. We find that our factor has a robust...

Corporate bond prices are known to be influenced by default and term structure risk in addition to non-default risks such as illiquidity. Putable corporate bonds allow investors to sell their holdings back to the issuer and may thus provide insurance against all of these risks. We first document...

We build a benchmark for AAA-rated tranches of Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs) using Business Development Companies (BDCs), which hold a diversified portfolio of loans as CLOs do. However, BDCs are publicly listed, and their share price, equity volatility and borrowing cost are...

A closet indexer is more likely to meet a value-weighted investment benchmark by value-weighting the portfolio. Following this intuition, we introduce a simple measure of active management, the absolute difference between the value weights and the actual weights held by a fund, averaged across...

Principal customers have strong incentives to screen and/or monitor suppliers to ensure supply-chain stability; consequently, the implicit certification from the existence of long-term relationships with principal customers has reputational consequences that potentially spill over to other...

This article focuses on financial maintenance covenants as incentive instruments for borrowers under both moral hazard and adverse selection. We explain why maintenance covenants are conditioned on public information. We examine the effect of the firm's incentive to risk-shift, debt amount, and...

At any point in time, most firms are not in financial distress. This implies that they must suffer value losses unrelated to their leverage--economic shocks--before becoming financially distressed. We show that if estimates of ex-ante financial distress costs are not filtered from the effects of...