This paper studies optimal auction design with asymmetric linear financial externalities among bidders. When the matrix Γ that relates biddersʼ payoffs to their payments is nonsingular, the payment-related component in the design objective must equal a unique linear combination of its...

Donations in-kind can be a mixed blessing for charities, who are often more adept at solicitation than resale. Many organizations rely on raffles to turn donations into cash, but auctions are also common. Theory predicts that all-pay mechanisms should produce more revenue than winner-pay...

We analyze two reasons for export prices to be different across markets - namely, quality differentiation and variable markups - and attempt to parse their relative importance and some of their underlying drivers. To overcome the substantial measurement issues in this task, we consider a...

Estimate bias and “no-sales” are investigated in the context of Latin American Art auctions conducted in New York between 1977 and 1996. We find that, using a new method for calculating bias, both Sotheby's and Christie's overestimated art (oil-on-canvas pieces) by 2.7 percent. The inclusion...

The death of an artist constitutes a negative shock to his future production; it permanently decreases the artist's float. We use this shock to test predictions of speculative trading models with short-selling constraints. Symmetrically to Hong et al. (2006), where an increase in float decreases...

Since the growth of the art market into a capitalized global art industry, public and academic discourse on art auctions has been dominated by record prices. Despite the financial potential of art auctions as well as the public and academic interest in art, understanding of auction prices is...