In this paper we investigate the exclusion of types in optimal auctions. We show that multidimensional types exclusion is a general phenomenon.

In this paper I first present a new convergence result which will derive an optimal auction mechanism as a limit of standard nonlinear pricing mechanisms. For example, an optimal auction mechanism of Myerson (1981) will be explicitly derived as a limit of nonlinear pricing mechanisms by Mussa...

We analyze optimal schemes for privatization in a transitional economy. In many cases, established Western firms are good candidates for large shareholders of a local firm, since the sale of the shares can generate large amount of revenues and furthermore, in the future, the home country can...

This paper addresses the issue of the choice of the optimal instrument to sell new shares, this choice being price versus quantity discrimination (rationing). Previous results in the literature (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990) show that the issuing firm would be better off if allowed to use both...

We characterize the optimal selling mechanism in a scenario where similar goods are sold to “high end” buyers through a posted price and to “lower end” buyers through an auction. We show that the optimal mechanism involves an auction which is a standard optimal auction (Myerson (1981))...

We study collusion in an IPV auction with binary type spaces. Collusion is organized by a third-party than can manipulate participation decisions. We characterize the optimal response of the seller to different threats of collusion among the bidders. We show that, contrary to the prevailing view...

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. When bidders' types are independent (with^Mpossibly bidder-specific distributions) and their valuations are...

In this note I prove the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated.

We extend Myerson's (1981) model by allowing for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In such extension the Revenue Equivalence Theorem still holds and the optimal allocation rule remains the same. Hence, the optimal auction can be implemented with an appropriate reserve price. Nonetheless,...