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We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each … resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric … of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500283
We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each … resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric … of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010463922
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011804761
We investigate efficiency properties of sealed-bid second-price auctions with costly participation and resale. Each … resale is not allowed and the bidder valuations are drawn from a strictly convex distribution function, the symmetric … of these equilibria without resale is sufficient for existence of similarly constructed two-cutoff equilibria with resale …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115203
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471143
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid first-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009451730
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012154887
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012664122
The potential revenues of water right transactions can be substantial in theory, but the actual receipts are generally limited in practice. This difference is attributable to the presence of other factors influencing the operation of water markets. In this paper, we study the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010794150
When bidders have different risk aversion levels, we determine in a first-price auction, the asymmetric equilibrium strategies. We analyze the impact of asymmetric risk aversion levels on bidders’ markups and on the expected revenue and allocative efficiency of the auction.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576428