Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms' investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using...

Overconfident CEOs are more willing to initiate investment projects that require experimentation, yet tend to defer responding to the bad news when the project is not performing as planned. Accounting conservatism accelerates the recognition of the bad news and its dissemination to gatekeepers,...

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual-based earnings management, real activities-based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following Malmendier and Tate (2005), we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to...

This paper examines how overconfidence affects the properties of management forecasts. Using both the lsquo;over-optimism' and lsquo;miscalibration' dimensions of overconfidence to generate our predictions, we examine three research questions. First, we examine whether overconfidence increases...

A detailed analysis of firms subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) in the 1990s and 2000s suggests that approximately one-quarter are the result of an act that is consistent with legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement...