Bei der Reform des weiterführenden Schulzugangs sollte Berlin internationale Erfahrungen nutzen. Es kommt beim Auswahlverfahren auf die Details an. Ein zentrales Verfahren und eine größere Zahl möglicher Schülerwünsche sind entscheidend. Losverfahren sind nicht per se ungerecht. Sie...

Die Reform der Studienplatzvergabe ist verschoben - trotz offensichtlicher Vorteile des neuen Verfahrens. Hochschulen können ihre Studienplätze früher, effizienter und nach eigenen Wünschen vergeben. Strategisches Bewerber-Verhalten zahlt sich nicht mehr aus. Das schafft Chancengleichheit....

Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a real-effort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the team. We find that female and male performance differ most in mixed teams with revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in...

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The fi rst mechanism is a simplifi ed version of the mechanism currently employed by the German...

With the help of a simple model, we show that the hindsight bias can lead to inefficient delegation decisions. This prediction is tested experimentally. In an online experiment that was conducted during the FIFA World Cup 2010 participants were asked to predict a number of outcomes of the...

We investigate the possibility that a decision-maker prefers to avoid making a decision and instead delegates it to an external device, e.g., a coin flip. In a series of experiments our participants often choose a stochastically dominated lottery between outcomes, contradicting most theories of...

We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further...

A model of herding behavior on the labor market is discussed where employers only receive signals with limited precision about the workers' types, but can observe previous employers' decisions. In particular, we study a situation where the employer and the worker can influence the signal...

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influenced by norm entrepreneurs, e.g. lawmakers, government agencies, unions etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamics of normfollowing behavior are analyzed, namely transforming the (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the...