We consider a model in which dealers intermediate trades between clients and provide immediacy, or, market liquidity. Dealers can exert unobservable effort to improve the chance of intermediating profitably. This moral-hazard friction impairs dealers' ability to raise external finance and hence...

This working paper was written by Max Bruche (Humboldt University of Berlin) and John C.F. Kuong (INSEAD).We consider a model in which dealers intermediate trades between clients and provide immediacy, or, market liquidity. Dealers can exert unobservable effort to improve the chance of...

Does securitization distort the foreclosure decisions of non-performing mortgages? In a model of mortgage-backed securitization with an endogenous foreclosure policy, we find that the securitizing bank adopts a tougher foreclosure policy than the first-best, despite resulting in higher loan...

How does securitisation distort the foreclosure decision of non-performing mortgages? In a model in which informed securitisers raise liquidity by jointly designing the mortgage-backed security and the foreclosure policy, the authors find that securitisers optimally adopt an excessive...