Broadly speaking, institutional reformers decide about the sequencing of types of reforms, either addressing institutional quality or macroeconomic stability. This paper develops a dynamic population game, in which agents play a simple anonymous-exchange game of cooperating or defecting. Agents...

Existing long-term energy and climate scenarios are typically a rather simple extrapolation of past trends. Both qualitative and quantitative outlooks co-exist, but they often focus narrowly on individual perspectives, which is opposed to the interlinked and complex nature of energy and climate....

Existing long-term energy and climate scenarios are typically a rather simple extrapolation of past trends. Both qualitative and quantitative outlooks co-exist, but they often focus narrowly on individual perspectives, which is opposed to the interlinked and complex nature of energy and climate....

Political economy analysis deals, basically, with modeling and interpreting the dynamics of a multi-agent economic/political sphere. This paper proposes a new technique for analysis of political economy in a game-theoretical framework based on multi-criteria decision making methods (MCDMs). To...

This paper examines a class of three-agent games with a principal and two identical agents. The role of the principal is to facilitate efficient outcomes for the two agents which are not feasible in his absence. Our results show that imposing a mediator or "facilitator" on "any" two person...

We consider an infinite-horizon model of elections where policy changes are costly for citizens and parties. The so-called costs of change increase with the extent of the policy shift and make policy history-dependent. First, we provide a detailed description of the equilibrium dynamics and...

We consider an infinite-horizon model of elections where policy changes are costly for citizens and parties. The so-called costs of change increase with the extent of the policy shift and make policy history-dependent. First, we provide a detailed description of the equilibrium dynamics and...

This article investigates rationalizable implementation in social environments where agents can provide hard evidence on the private information they possess. Specifically, we study necessary and sufficient conditions for virtual implementation using a notion of Rationalizability that captures...

We analyze the optimal length of political terms (equivalently, the optimal frequency with which elections should be held) when the candidates of two polarized parties compete for office and the median voter shifts over time. Office-holders determine policy and experience persistent random...

In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their "exclusiveness" we find that these...