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Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences : ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects
Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2020
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object … (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012303350
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 511-544
establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308444
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Mechanism design without quasilinearity
Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2017
establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657364
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Who cares more? : allocation with diverse preference intensities
Ortoleva, Pietro; Safonov, Evgenii; Yariv, Leeat - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012609683
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A theory of school-choice lotteries
Kesten, Onur; Ünver, M. Utku - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 2, pp. 543-595
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346884
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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness
Meisner, Vincent - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 69 (2023) 5, pp. 2733-2745
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305432
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Optimal allocation without money : an engineering approach
Ashlagi, Itai; Shi, Peng - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 62 (2016) 4, pp. 1078-1097
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460576
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A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof : an experiment for the Vickrey auction
Masuda, Takehito; Sakai, Toyataka; Serizawa, Shigehiro; … - 2019
We conduct laboratory experiments for the Vickrey auction with and without an announcement on strategy-proofness to subjects. Although the rate of truth-telling among the subjects stays at 20% without the announcement, it increases to 47% with the announcement. Moreover, by conducting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024698
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Course match : a large-scale implementation of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation
Budish, Eric B.; Cachon, Gérard; Kessler, Judd B.; … - In: Operations research 65 (2017) 2, pp. 314-336
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673099
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Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem
Le, Phuong - In: International journal of economic theory 13 (2017) 4, pp. 369-385
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011977636