This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

On financial markets many investment decisions are taken by groups and not by individuals. The evidence, however, whether groups better than individuals, is ambigous. We analyze the portfolios of groups and individuals in an asset allocation task on an experimental market. We find that groups on...

This paper argues that observations of non-stationary choice behavior need notnecessarily imply specific properties of the individual’s discount function. As weshow, the observed “anomalies” in intertemporal choice can alternatively be explained by an individual’s perception of the risk...

We consider a simple CAPM with heterogenous expectations on assets mean returns while keeping the assumption of homogenous expectations on the covariance of returns. Our first result derives the security market line as an aggregation result without using the two-fund-separation property. In...

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete markets in which we derive conditions for separating the savings decision from the asset allocation decision. It is shown that with logarithmic utility functions this separation holds for any heterogeneity of discount factors while...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...