This paper focuses on strategic interaction within a family and examines individual decision making. We set up a two-stage game model. In the first stage of the game, a man and a woman who have not yet met simultaneously determine their education levels non-cooperatively. In the second stage,...

We investigate how income inequality affects social welfare in a model of voluntary contributions to multiple pure public goods. Itaya, de Meza, and Myles (1997) show that the maximization of social welfare precludes income equality in a single pure public good model. In contrast, we show that...

This paper investigates how the heterogenous incomes and preferences of potential donors affect the timing of contribution decisions when it is endogenously determined by contributors themselves. More specifically, we use a simple setting with two donors, Cobb-Douglas preferences, and complete...

Although a large number of studies have been done on intergenerational transfers of goods, little is known about intergenerational transfers of time. In step with an increase in the aging of the population, the demand for time-intensive transfers in health care and other health services...

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model where agents face the uncertainty of intergenerational transfers from their children. To avoid this kind of risk, agents have an incentive to share the risk within the same generation. However, there exists an information asymmetry about the...

In this paper, we use a two-period overlapping generations model to examine the behavior of an economy that incorporates intergenerational transfers of time. In the first part, we describe the dynamics and steady state of the economy in which there is no government. We show that the rate of life...

This note develops a one-sector, two-period, overlapping generations model that incorporates endogenous labor-care choice. Care choice is modeled by allowing young agents to participate in the production of household health status. Using this model, we derive the steady-state equilibrium dynamics.