This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …

This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders' fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the …

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options …

People's fairness preferences are an important constraint for what constitutes an acceptable economic transaction, yet … arising from previous transactions play an important role in shaping perceptions of fairness. Buyers used to high market … two classes of models of path-dependent fairness preferences - either based on endogenous fairness reference points or …

People's fairness preferences are an important constraint for what constitutes an acceptable economic transaction, yet … play an important role in shaping perceptions of fairness. Buyers used to high market prices, for example, are more likely …-dependent fairness preferences - either based on endogenous fairness reference points or based on shifts in salience - that can account …

In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an … endogenous outside option for a bargaining agent. Behavioral agents are commitment types that demand a constant portion of the …, there is one-sided reputation building in bargaining, and commitment types on the short side determine the terms of trade …

discrimination, 22% with ineifficient matching, and 50% with search costs. Large consumer-base banks have margins 70% higher than …

Subgame perfect equilibrium predictions of ultimatum bargaining games correspond poorly to the data gathered from human …