Hedge fund activists have ambiguous relationships with the institutional shareholders in their target firms. While some support their activities, others counter their actions. Due to their relatively small holdings in target firms, the activists typically need the cooperation of other...

This paper provides direct evidence in support of the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as an explanation for the January effect. Specifically, we examine the turn-of-the-year return and volume patterns of an asset class held almost entirely by tax-sensitive individual investors: municipal bond...

In the early 1900's American financial institutions were active participants in U.S. corporate governance but the enactment of securities laws in the 1930's limited the power of financial intermediaries and thus their governance role. The consequence of such laws and regulations was a...

To study attention and learning effects in financial markets, we investigate the role of media coverage in investment decisions of mutual fund investors and the consequent effects on fund flows. Employing a database of nearly 10,000 news articles and controlling for endogeneity in media...

We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are composed of interrelated mechanisms, which are in turn endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose those mechanisms. Examining board structures and the use of corporate charter...

We examine the effects of mutual fund families' strategic decisions, particularly the advertising decision, on investor flows into the families. We find evidence that beyond performance a family's strategic decisions such as advertising, distribution channels, fund offerings and expense ratios,...

Shareholder activism by institutions is an important aspect of U.S. financial markets. We provide an overview of shareholder activism by institutional and individual investors, emphasising their focus on corporate governance, the identity of the activists, and a brief history of their...

Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The model predicts...

We examine the high volume return premium across countries as a test of the investor recognition hypothesis. Our cross-country tests are consistent with the hypothesis in that we find the magnitude of the premium is associated with market characteristics that relate to the importance of a...

We provide arguments and present evidence that corporate governance structures are endogenous responses to the costs and benefits firms face when they choose the mechanisms that comprise those structures. In particular, an industry's investment opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive...