Financial reform must not ignore the interests of small stakeholders – who must be regarded as too small to be counted. Making equity an explicit objective is delicate: it needs to be calibrated such that the vulnerable are not exposed to further risks. Policies outside the realm of financial...

This paper empirically analyzes the determinants of banks' systemic importance. In constructing a measure on the systemic importance of financial institutions we find that size is a leading determinant. This confirms the usual "Too big to fail" argument. Nevertheless, banks with size above a...

We replicate three bank failure models (Martin (1977), Cole and White (2012), and DeYoung and Torna (2013)) and introduce a new predictive model along with several evaluation methods to compare their out-of-sample predictive accuracy. We find that the models are highly accurate individually, and...

We characterize the optimal banking union with endogenous participation in a two-country economy in which domestic bank failures may be contemporaneous to sovereign crises, giving rise to risk-sharing motives to mutualize the funding of bailouts. Bank bail-ins create disruption costs that are...

We estimate the real effects of resolving distressed banks using quasi-experimental variation in resolutions introduced by a threshold-based rule of the FDIC Improvement Act. We find that resolutions reduce employment and establishments growth by up to six percentage points. These effects are...

This paper tests the role of different banks' liquidity funding structures in explaining the bank failures that occurred in the United States between 2007 and 2009. The results highlight that funding is indeed a significant factor in explaining banks' probability of default. By confirming the...

We examine sources of systemic risk (threshold size, complexity, and interconnectedness) with factors constructed from equity returns of large financial firms, after accounting for standard risk factors. From the factor loadings and factor returns, we estimate the implicit government subsidy for...

This paper analyzes the bail-in tool under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this...

This paper analyses the bail-in tool under the BRRD and predicts that it will not reach its policy objective. To make this argument, this paper first describes the policy rationale that calls for mandatory private sector involvement (PSI). From this analysis the key features for an effective...

This paper takes a unique approach to study the relationship between bank capital and Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) during the Financial Crisis. A structural credit risk model is used to compute implied market value capital ratios which, when compared to traditional risk-based capital, illustrates the...