This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

Auction models are convenient abstractions of informal price-formation processes that arise in markets for assets or services. These processes involve frictions such as bidder recruitment costs for sellers, participation costs for bidders, and limitations on sellersícommitment abilities. This...

We study information transmission through informal elections. Our leading example is that of protests in which there may be positive costs or benefits of participation. The aggregate turnout provides information to a policy maker. However, the presence of activists adds noise to the turnout. The...

This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price offers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power...

In this paper, we study auctions with outside options provided by future market interaction focusing on the revenue effects of some information revelation policies. We show that auctions with less information revelation may yield higher revenues. In particular, we show that it is never optimal...

This paper presents a new characterization result for competitive allocations in quasilinear economies. This result is informed by the analysis of non-cooperative dynamic search and bargaining games. Such games provide models of decentralized markets with trading frictions. A central objective...

We prove existence of steady-state equilibrium in a class of matching modelswith search frictions.

I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyerʼs valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation...