This paper studies optimal schemes for allocating scarce resources to agents with private demand information and heterogeneous bargaining powers. Through an investigation of a mechanism design model that aims to induce agents to report their demands truthfully, we find the following results....

Many companies are under pressure to improve pay transparency; however, its impact on their agents and principals remains unclear. As a way to investigate the upside and downside of pay transparency, we conduct a study that focuses on a scenario where agents have “cognitive bias” (namely,...

[Problem definition.] To alleviate farmer poverty, governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are developing different mechanisms for disseminating market information to farmers in developing countries. This paper examines whether a wider dissemination of information will always...

We examine a (large) manufacturer's bribery decision (to bribe or not to bribe) arising from a procurement auction under "disparate corruption pressure'' when another (small) manufacturer is known to offer the auctioneer (i.e., the intermediary) a bribe in exchange for the "right of first...

We theoretically and experimentally examine the impact of pay transparency policies and payment schemes on individuals’ effort decisions and their performance. By considering the “no information” policy as a benchmark that only informs each agent of his own performance and pay, we examine...

A critical issue for many governments is boosting the adoption rates of products or technologies that enhance consumer surplus or total social welfare. Governments may, for example, pay subsidies to producers or to consumers to stimulate the manufacture or consumption of specific products, for...