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Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A. - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

conditions under which auctions may select inefficient firms and therefore lead to an inefficient allocation of resources …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144557

Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions

Davis, David E. - Economics Department, South Dakota State University - 2011

US government agencies in WIC infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009367465

Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

None available

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844

The Generalized War of Attrition

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1997

We model a War of Attrition with N+K firms competing for N prizes. If firms must pay their full costs until the whole game ends, even after dropping out themselves (as in a standard-setting context), each firms exit time is independent both of K and of other players actions. If, instead, firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605042

Applying Auction Theory to Economics

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605125

Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism

Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Eicke, Anselm; Hirth, Lion; … - 2024

This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014546505

Electricity Markets : Designing Auctions Where Suppliers Have Uncertain Costs

Holmberg, Par - 2016

We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996150

Pre-Emptive Horizontal Mergers : Theory and Evidence

Molnar, Jozsef - 2007

This paper proposes and tests an explanation as to why rational managers seeking to maximize shareholder value can pursue value-decreasing mergers. It can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and decrease shareholder value if the loss is less than in an alternative where the merger is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223569

Collusion and Predation in Auction Markets

Klemperer, Paul - 2001

, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems …, and the Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may often perform better. Effective anti … fail in the Netherlands and elsewhere. Auction design is not "one size fits all". We also discuss the 3G spectrum auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135971

Price Dispersion in Electricity Auctions : The Strategic Foundation and Implication to Market Design

Hu, Shanshan; Kapuscinski, Roman; Lovejoy, William S. - 2014

We model uniform and discriminatory auctions in wholesale electricity markets. High variability of electricity prices …-averse or have asymmetric capacities, expected procurement costs are also lower in discriminatory auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044835