Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size.Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game with noise - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was publicly observed.Adding the strategy to wait to the noisy...

In a three player dynamic public goods experiment, social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow.In each period, players choose to sabotage, to co-operate, or to play best response.Sabotage harms social output and growth.Mutual co-operation maximises both.The property rights...

We present an experimental study of a risky sequential bargaining to model negotiations in risky joint ventures that proceed through multiple stages.Our example is the production of a movie that may give rise to a sequel, so actors and producers negitiate sequentially.We compare the predictions...

The aim of the present study is to construct a state feedback controller for a given linear system that minimizes the worst-case effect of an L2 -bounded disturbance. Our setting is different from the usual framework of H -theory in that we consider nonzero initial conditions. The situation is...

Most of the known efficient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii) all essential coalitions in any of the games in the class...

In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria, and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium.We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognized...