This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...

The example of the "absent-minded driver" was introduced by Piccione & Rubinstein [1995] in the context of games and decision problems with imperfect recall. They claim that a "paradox" or "inconsistency" arises when the decision reached at the "planning stage" is compared with that at the...

In a patent race, social incentives and private incentives may sometimes coincide and at other times diverge - too many researchers remain in the race. If the social planner cannot determine what stage the researchers have achieved, this informational constraint can result in a socially...

We study Bayesian mechanism design in situations where agents' information may be multi-dimensional, concentrating on mechanisms that lead to efficient allocations. Our main result is that a generalization of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism maximizes the planner's "revenue" among...

An analogue of Vickrey's (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values and one-dimensional private information. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an efficient ex-post equilibrium

In many tournaments investments are made over time and conducting a review only once at the end, or also at points midway through, is a strategic decision of the tournament designer. If the latter is chosen, then a rule according to which the results of the different reviews are aggregated into...