How do exporting firms react to sanctions? Specifically, which firms are willing - or capable - to serve the market of a sanctioned country? We investigate this question for four sanctions episodes drawing on recent econometric advances in bias-corrected dynamic high-dimensional fixed effects...

The extensive margin of bilateral trade exhibits a high level of persistence that cannot be explained by geography or trade policy. We combine a heterogeneous firms model of international trade with bounded productivity with features from the firm dynamics literature to derive expressions for an...

How do exporting firms react to sanctions? Specifically, which firms are willing - or capable - to serve the market of a sanctioned country? We investigate this question for four sanctions episodes drawing on recent econometric advances in bias-corrected dynamic high-dimensional fixed effects...

The extensive margin of bilateral trade exhibits a high level of persistence that cannot be explained by geography or trade policy. We combine a heterogeneous firms model of international trade with bounded productivity with features from the firm dynamics literature to derive expressions for an...

Zunehmend setzen Staaten auf Allianzen oder Koalitionen, um gemeinsam Sanktionen gegen ein Drittland zu verhängen. Die Auswirkungen einer solchen Koordination sind jedoch unklar. Dieser Wochenbericht analysiert die Sanktionswelle gegen Russland im Jahr 2014 anhand von 400000 Simulationen mit...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii)...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii)...

This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition setups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanctions senders and target; (ii)...