The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these incentives, including charter value, regulation, and managerial incentives, the net economic effect of these incentives is an empirical...

A review of major lines of thinking about developments in the 1980s bearing on the likelihood of a financial crisis in the United States supports four principal conclusions:<br>First, financial crises have historically played a major role in large fluctuations in business activity. A financial...

This paper documents a set of new stylized facts about leverage and financial fragility for emerging market firms following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Corporate debt vulnerability indicators during the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) attributed to corporate financial roots provide a...

At the macro level, recent policy-relevant research establishes an association between credit booms and banking distress; the focus is on leverage. However, scant evidence is available at the micro level. This study analyses the relationship between lending growth, leverage, and distress at the...