Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is commonly understood as providing a formal rationale for the existence of bank …-run equilibria. It has never been clear, however, whether bank-run equilibria in this framework are a natural byproduct of the … (2003) demonstrate that bank-run equilibria can exist under an optimal contractual arrangement. The difficulty of preventing …

We examine the role of private deposit insurance for deposit flows, bank lending, and moral hazard during a financial …

make bank deposits endogenously long-term. Capital regulation addresses deposit dilution but is subject to a time … significantly impacts optimal bank capital regulation. We examine how capital regulation stringency changes across different … countries around the 2008 global financial crisis and document novel facts that are consistent with our theory …

We study bank runs using a novel historical cross-country dataset that covers 184 countries over the past 200 years and … combines a new narrative chronology with statistical indicators of bank deposit withdrawals. We document the following facts …: (i) the unconditional likelihood of a bank run is 1.2% and that of significant deposit withdrawals 12.7%; (ii …

needs withdraw their deposits early and are not willing to re finance a bank. Early withdrawals curtail excessive bank … lending and thereby commit a bank to monitoring. In contrast, banks with coupon bonds can refi nance in the interim stage and … expand on risky lending, which derails monitoring. This finding speaks against the separation of bank lending and deposit …

We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how – in times of crisis – depositors react to a bank … nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit insurance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank …

rates, impact on credit spreads, and substitution between deposits and other bank liabilities. I develop a monetary model …

credit-registry and regulatory bank data, we find that banks can incur an increase in their funding costs of at least 30 …

their banks and impose rate premiums based on each bank's indigenous risk. With these reforms, some very costly …. -- Reforming FDIC insurance ; moral hazard ; market discipline ; bank risk pricing ; cost of funds to banks …