We analyse the incentive impact of bank capital regulation in a model with endogenous capital, assuming regulators randomly audit banks and require undercapitalised banks either to bear the fixed cost of new issue or to liquidate. Forward looking banks with sufficient franchise value maintain a...

Bank risk-taking and capitalisation is studied in a continuous time model with a closed form solution, assuming uncertain cash flow, random regulatory audit, and a constraint on equity issue. Capital reserves are built up towards a desired level as an insurance against the threat of liquidation....

We correct the analysis of the model of time to build in Majd and Pindyck (1987 Journal of Financial Economics 18, 7-27) for the omission of an essential optimality condition. Our analysis reveals an additional insight: long times to build reduce the effects of increased project value volatility...

More than half of S&P 500 CEOs receive options annually, however extant valuation models have not accounted for portfolio considerations. We show the inability of executives to diversify means portfolio effects matter: exercise thresholds and shareholder costs are lower than for stand-alone...

We consider the optimal exercise of a portfolio of American call options in an incomplete market. Options are written on a single underlying asset but may have different characteristics of strikes, maturities and vesting dates.Our motivation is to model the decision faced by an employee who is...