``Limits of Arbitrage" theories require that the marginal investor in a particular asset market be a specialized arbitrageur. Then the constraints faced by this arbitrageur (i.e. capital constraints) feed through into asset prices. We examine the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market in this...

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

In many markets consumer biases do not affect prices, since competition forces firms to price their products close to marginal cost; competition protects the consumer. We show that noisy consumer product evaluations undermine the force of competition, enabling firms to charge high mark-ups in...

This paper develops a simple equilibrium model of CEO pay. CEOs have different talents and are matched to firms in a competitive assignment model. In market equilibrium, a CEO%u2019s pay changes one for one with aggregate firm size, while changing much less with the size of his own firm. The...

We quantitatively investigate the ideas behind the often-expressed adage `it takes volume to move stock prices', and study the statistical properties of the number of shares traded $Q_{\Delta t}$ for a given stock in a fixed time interval $\Delta t$. We analyze transaction data for the largest...

We respond to the issues discussed by Farmer and Lillo (FL) related to our proposed approach to understanding the origin of power-law distributions in stock price fluctuations. First, we extend our previous analysis to 1000 US stocks and perform a new estimation of market impact that accounts...

We review the accumulated knowledge on city size distributions and determinants of urban growth. This topic is of interest because of a number of key stylized facts, including notably Zipf’s law for cities (which states that the number of cities of size greater than S is proportional to 1/S)...