We present a model of financial media. In our model, firms strategically use the media to communicate corporate announcements to a group of traders, who do not observe announcements directly, but only through media reports. Journalists strategically select which announcements to report to their...

If the price system is superior to central planning, why do firms exist with sub-economies that are very large, approximating small capitalist economies? In a principal-agent setting we compare a market, in which two principal-agent pairs trade, to a corporation in which a single principal hires...

In a multidivision firm, does the market collect less value-relevant information when the divisions are treated as a unit rather than when each division trades as a separate firm? We find that organizational form has a nontrivial impact on information collection. In particular, we find that a...

When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals...

When a firm forms a market closes. Resources that were previously allocated via the price system are allocated by managerial authority within the firm. We explore this choice of organizational form using a model of price formation in which agents negotiate prices on behalf of their principals...