We examine the relation between CEOs equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower's performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distresswhile also...

I study large charitable stock gifts by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies. These gifts, which are not subject to insider trading law, often occur just before sharp declines in their companies share prices. This timing is more pronounced when executives donate their own shares to their own...

Company stock option plans have diverse acirc;not;Ssunsetacirc;not;? policies for modifying terms of options held by managers who exit the firm. In our Samp;P 500 sample, these forfeiture, vesting, and expiration provisions are less generous in companies characterized by fast growth, dependence on...

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3 percent of the incremental...

I study large charitable gifts by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies using their own company stock as the donation currency. Unlike open market sales, gifts of stock are not subject to insider trading law and have very lenient disclosure requirements.Consistent with their exemption from...

This paper analyzes stock option wards to CEOs of 792 U.S. public corporations between 1984 and 1991. Using a Black-Scholes approach, I test whether stock options performance incentives have significant associations with explanatory variables related to agency cost reduction. Further tests...

This paper proposes and implements a new method for investigating whether CEOs influence the terms of their own compensation. I analyze the dates of 591 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies in 1992 and 1993, finding that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in...

This paper proposes and implements a new method for investigating whether CEOs influence the terms of their own compensation. I analyze the dates of 619 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, finding that the timing of awards coincides with favorable...

We investigate whether convertibility provisions and restrictive covenants operate as substitute methods for reducing agency costs of debt. In a study of the 192 recent debt issues, we find that an issuer s investment opportunities are negatively related to the presence of covenants and...

We test the prediction that leverage is inversely associated with managerial entrenchment. We examine leverage levels and year-to-year changes for several hundred firms between 1984 and 1991. We find that leverage levels are positively related to CEO stock ownership and CEO stock option...