This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the...

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected...

We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by...

Little is known about the family firm as an economic entity except for the very few family firms that are public. Our paper describes a wide range of governance and finance characteristics in the population of all private and public family firms with limited liability. We find that the family...

We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5%...

We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder's equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict...

This paper first describes the institutional framework for corporate governance in Norway, concluding that its civil law tradition of Roman origin provides a relatively strong protection of shareholder rights. Using a data set which is exceptionally rich and accurate by international standards,...

Using unusually rich and accurate data from Oslo Stock Exchange firms, we find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, that insider ownership matters the most, that outside ownership concentration destroys market value, that direct ownership is superior to indirect, and that...

This paper compares the dividend policy of firms controlled by owners to firms where owners have a minority stake relative to non-owning employees, customers, and the local community. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the...

This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information...