This paper investigates the relationship between family firm, internal, external governance and corporate fraud. We focus on the judicial and market attitude toward professional top managers, not controlling shareholder, involved in corporate fraud, especially in family-controlled business group...

This paper investigates the relationship between family firm, internal, external governance and corporate fraud. We focus on the judicial and market attitude toward professional top managers, not controlling shareholder, involved in corporate fraud, especially in family-controlled business group...

In this paper, we explore the relationship between CEO's political preference and post-retirement directorship holding by individual CEOs. We test a hypothesis that CEO's political preference might be a signal for (potential) political network in the professional labor market. We use a data set...

This paper investigates judicial size premium, the judicial bias in favor of large economic organizations. The Korean judiciary is biased with regard to chaebols (large family business groups). Convicted chaebol-related defendants receive 9.9%p more jail-sentence suspension and 19 month shorter...

I construct an intertemporal searching model (take it or leave it offer) in a frictional directorship market to explain the unbalanced matching between the director and the firm. In this model, potential candidates for outside directors and firms have heterogeneous (also, well ordered) quality...

We use an OLG model to study the effects of the generous public sector pension system in Brazil. In our model there are two types of workers, one working in the private sector, the other working in the public sector. Public workers produce infrastructure or education services. We find that...