Vertical integration is often proposed as a way to resolve hold-up problems, ignoring the empirical fact that division managers tend to maximize divisional (not firmwide) profit when investing. This paper develops a model with asymmetric information at the bargaining stage and investment returns...

In this chapter, we review the use of TCE in the study of interfirm relationships. An extensive literature in economics and business strategy delves into interfirm governance choices. In our review, we focus on accounting and non-accounting studies to assess how TCE has contributed and can...

This paper reviews and proposes additional research concerning the role of publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of corporations. We first review and analyze research on the use of financial accounting measures in managerial incentive plans and explore...

This paper empirically examines how changes in the hierarchical structure of a large organization can affect incentives. The empirical analysis exploits a change in the hierarchical structure of the Corporate Division of a private foreign commercial bank in Argentina between 1999 and 2001. Using...

In this paper, we study a setting where a firm (principal) is privately informed of the firm's potential and contracts with an agent to supply unobservable effort. We show it can be optimal for the firm to have loose monitoring in the sense that the monitoring system is less perfect than what is...

This article investigates the co-relationship of operating performance with implementation of ERP system in listed companies. The descriptive statistics reveals that the operating performance of ERP companies in 2003, that ROS, ROI, ROE and ROA regarded as companies' operating performance index...

This chapter reviews the recent economic literature on transfer pricing. As a starting point, we take Hirshleifer's transfer pricing model and discuss the basic structure of the most widely used model extensions. We review transfer pricing models with asymmetric information, transfer pricing...

In this paper, I extend the organizational design literature by examining how the delegation choice is affected by the ability to resolve the incentive problem caused by this delegation. Based on the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), I argue that the...

Economic theory suggests that there are complementarities between the various components of a firm's organizational design (Milgrom and Roberts (1992)). With the exception of Nagar (2002) which examines the joint determination of two components of the management control system, incentive...