A bilateral moral-hazard problem provides a rationale for "up-or-ou t" employment contracts. The employer sets a wage higher than opportunit y cost to induce the worker to invest in firm-specific capital. If the individual does not make the grade, it is in the firm's interest ex post to fire...

The Value Line investment record is frequently interpreted as evidence of market inefficiency. This article reconciles the record with market efficiency as one implication of a model that assumes a semistrong form of market efficiency and autoregressive state variables, which need not be...

This paper presents a strategic theory of contract renegotiation. In this theory, suboptimal contracts are put in place initially to protect one party against undesirable a ctions by another party and are renegotiated once the danger is past. The authors develop a model to establish the cases in...

In an environment where trading volume affects security prices and where prices are uncertain when trades are submitted, quasi-arbitrage is the availability of a series of trades that generate infinite expected profits with an infinite Sharpe ratio. We show that when the price impact of trades...

Building on recent developments in behavioral asset pricing, we develop a model in which an increase in the dispersion of investor beliefs under short-selling constraints predicts a rise in stock price above its fundamental value, or bubble. The model predicts managers respond to bubbles by...