Recent studies in the accounting literature provide evidence of an equity price premium whenever firms meet or exceed analysts' earnings forecasts. That is, the market perceives the act of meeting earnings forecasts as a signal about future firm performance. Financial analysts typically issue...

We examine market participants' reactions to dividend changes conditional on earnings quality. We define earnings quality as the extent to which current earnings are associated with one-year, two-year, or three-year ahead operating cash flows. Controlling for the magnitude of the dividend...

We examine how accounting transparency and investor base jointly affect financial analysts' expectations of mispricing (i.e., expectations of stock price deviations from fundamental value). Within a range of transparency, these two factors interactively amplify analysts' expectations of...

We examine whether analysts include the managed earnings component in their forecasts or are surprised by the managed earnings component. We also investigate whether analysts' earnings forecasts for future periods and their stock recommendations are affected by earnings management in the current...

General evidence exists to indicate that managers manage earnings at three common earnings thresholds: analyst forecasts, prior period earnings, and zero earnings. We examine one market-based motivation suggested for this behavior. If managers perceive the market penalty for barely missing an...

We measure managerial affective states during earnings conference calls by analyzing conference call audio files using vocal emotion analysis software. We hypothesize and find that when managers are scrutinized by analysts during conference calls, positive and negative affect displayed by...

Valuation theory, investment managers, financial analysts, and textbooks advocating horizontal financial statement analysis suggest that the change in earnings growth (earnings acceleration) conveys value relevant information. We test this assertion using a large sample of U.S. firms. Results...

This paper examines the interaction between an analyst's disclosure and a manager's earnings report. We show how the nature of the analyst's information affects the quality of reported earnings. We also provide conditions for the analyst's disclosure to reduce the quality of investor information...

This paper unveils the rationality behind the widely criticized practice of consensus-beating, where companies try to report quarterly earnings equal to or slightly exceeding analysts expectations. In a simple theoretical model we show that a high-growth company can use active earnings guidance...

Prior research on meeting or beating earnings expectations focuses on managers' incentives to keep stock prices inflated by avoiding negative earnings surprises. However, in certain situations, managers may be motivated to depress stock prices in order to maximize their utility. We hypothesize...