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Commercial Lobbying : Institutions and Political Reforms

Groll, Thomas - 2015

This paper analyzes the effective regulation of commercial lobbying activities and focuses on the endogenous choice of regulatory institutions. The analysis uses a model of commercial lobbying in which citizens hire lobbyists to present policy matters on their behalf, and policymakers announce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035093

Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms

Boyer, Pierre C.; Esslinger, Christoph; Roberson, Brian - 2021

We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and choose the amount of public debt. Politicians also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236278

Public debt and the political economy of reforms

Boyer, Pierre C.; Esslinger, Christoph; Roberson, Brian - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012491550

Policy Reform as Collective Action

Johnson, Omotunde - 2006

A government desiring support for its policy reform program, without coercion, behaves as if it faces a political constraint. Citizen support depends on the estimate, by at least some minimum proportion of the population, that the program will succeed and the outcome will be in their individual...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012781967

Policy reforms and the amount of checks & balances

Gersbach, Hans; Tejada, Oriol; Wagner, Julia - 2022

We examine how democracies choose their amount of checks and balances (C&B). For this purpose, we consider a simple model of political competition with costly policy reforms. The cost of a marginal reform is determined endogenously at the constitutional phase-i.e. before policies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013337980

What Makes Reforms Likely : Political Economy Determinants of Reforms in Latin America

Lora, Eduardo A.; Olivera, Mauricio - 2011

The purpose of this paper is to test the main hypotheses of the recent theoretical literature on the political economy of reform for the case of the Latin American countries between 1985 and 1995. The paper first reviews the literature and extracts the main testable hypotheses. Then, a system of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069921

Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto

Morgenstern, Albrecht - 2004

Veto institutions are often dominated by government opponents with rival electoral and policy interests (e.g. \divided … government"). I investigate the tradeoff between policy control and policy blockade when both the government and the veto party … may cater to opposing special interests. The value of an opposition veto depends on whether electoral accountability can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263107

Curbing Power or Progress? Governing with an Opposition Veto

Morgenstern, Albrecht - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968400

Veto players and policy trade-offs : an intertemporal approach to study the effects of political institutions on policy

Scartascini, Carlos G.; Tommasi, Mariano; Stein, Ernesto - 2010

are two desirable properties of policymaking systems. The veto player approach has suggested that polities with more veto …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247136

Veto Power and Quality of Governmental Policy

Dragu, Tiberiu - 2010

commonly used procedure: ultimatum bargaining. We examine how the addition of the second decision maker (the veto player …) affects communication and the utilities of the players. Surprisingly, we find that the veto player may be worse off, and the … first decision maker may be better off, than in the absence of the veto threat …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715807